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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the development of the New Left of the
1960s, represented by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).
The SDS was founded in 1960 and supported by the Old Leftist League
for Industrial Democracy (LID) . In 1965 the SDS divorced itself
from the LID due to ideological and strategic differences in
reforming American society.
The SDS's anti-poverty program,
Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) served as an active
expression of Old Left and New Left differences. These differences
demonstrated by ERAP will receive special attention in this study.
As a consequence of the separation, the SDS was free to develop and
revive the American Left. But, its separation from the LID also
helped cause the SDS's disintegration and downfall in 1968/1969.

REVIVING THE AMERICAN LEFT:

ERAP AND THE LID-SDS CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the twentieth century, left-wing organizations have
been part of the American political scene.

The degree of influence

and effect of the Left has varied in accordance to events and major
political trends.

In order to remain politically alive, leftist

organizations have had to adjust their level of radicalism to the
current social, economic, and political trends of the era.. The
League for Industrial Democracy (LID) is a perfect example of a
leftist group which adapted its political views and strategies to
the current political mainstream.

In the Depression thirties, the

League was actively involved in advocating socialism in the United
States.

In the conservative and post-New Deal fifties, however,

the LID called for particularly modest social reforms regarding
Social Security and health care.

By the early 1960s, student

activists were disillusioned by the watered-down Left.

University

students perceived the postwar Left ineffective in a nation in need
of fundamental reforms in the areas of poverty, social equality,
free political debate, and an overarching, yet aloof, federal
bureaucracy.

In order to demand reforms effectively, student

activists believed that it was necessary to revive the Left.
This "new" Left was largely represented by the LID's student
organization, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), formed
2
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in 1960.

The SDS announced their views in their 1962 manifesto,

The Port Huron Statement. Besides outlining an agenda for domestic
and foreign policy reform for the sixties, The Port Huron Statement
represented the initiation of the revival of the American Left,
separate from the languid Old Leftist LID.

The first actual

project created solely by the SDS was the Economic Research and
Action Project (ERAP--"Ee-rap"). Begun in 1963, ERAP acted both as
a channel by which the SDS could demonstrate its concern for antipoverty and political reform and to serve as an agent by which the
SDS could Separate itself from the overbearing and ineffective LID.
Thus, it can be argued that The Port Huron Statement represented
the SDS's calling for a revived Left, while ERAP made the SDS's
interests in creating a New Left a physical reality.

Such activity

produced an independent environment which further helped to
alienate the LID from the SDS, a breach which became permanent by
1965.
ERAP emphasized the further separation of the SDS from the
LID and the reactivation of the American Left by designing its
strategies and approaches to poverty contrary to the principles of
the LID.

The SDS attacked the methods of the LID by advocating an

activist, rather than an educative, approach to ending poverty; by
renouncing the state liberalism of the Democratic party; and by
designing ERAP and its individual chapters to be representative of
decentralized and participatory democracy.
ERAP's rejection of LID tactics alone did not cause the LIDSDS breakup, but it did express differences between the two, making

such a division inevitable.

Once the separation did occur, the SDS

eliminated the influences of " 'old fogeyism' " and the New Left was
given the potential to flourish and create an identity unto itself.
But, detachment from the LID, brought freedom for which the SDS was
not prepared. Without the LID's experience with orthodox Marxist
organizations and the lack of a definite ideology of its own, the
SDS attracted an assortment of Leftist groups and people.
Therefore, organizations greatly different from the Port Huron
generation of SDSers (e.g., The Progressive Labor Party and
extreme radical elements which would form the Revolutionary Youth
Movement and the Weathermen) infiltrated the SDS and helped cause
its disintegration in 1968-1969.
In order to formulate the argument that the SDS used ERAP to
express itself as an organization strategically and ideologically
different from the postwar LID (Old Left) , it is necessary first to
present backgrounds of the LID and the SDS up to The Port Huron
Statement and the ensuing LID-SDS confrontation.

Following the

1962 conflict, the history of ERAP will be presented and its antiOld Left elements analyzed.

Finally, the thesis will conclude with

immediate and long-term implications of my interpretation of ERAP
as an agent which helped the New Left divorce itself from the Old
Left.

CHAPTER I
SDS-LID RELATIONS BEFORE ERAP
Immediately after the SDS was created in I960, it was at odds
with its parent organization, the League for Industrial Democracy.
The LID rebuked the SDS for its mailing list practices in 1960 and
for The Port Huron Statement in 1962.

Although differences

remained between the two, the LID sponsored the SDS until 1965 when
ideological and strategic differences became so deep that a
relationship was no longer feasible.

Such differences first became

visibly evident by the goals and tactics of the Economic Research
and Action Project.

In order to understand the rift between the

two left-wing organizations of the early 1960s, backgrounds and
definitions of the LID and the SDS are necessary.
When the LID was organized in 1905, by socialists Harry
Laidler, Upton Sinclair, and Jack London, the League was known
as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS). (1)

The ISS

concentrated its efforts on educating the American public about a
social order based on production use, rather than on profits.

The

ISS worked to achieve its pedagogic goal by sponsoring study
groups, research bureaus, socialist speakers on college campuses,
and by publishing essays and reports by its members. (2)

After the

ISS changed to the League for Industrial Democracy in 1921, the
5
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organization adopted an active role in American politics and
society.

For example, the LID participated in the

LaFollette-Wheeler Progressive party presidential campaign in
1924. (3)
In the 1930s, the work and popularity of the LID increased as
the League continued actively to advocate social change.

During

the Depression, the LID organized southern textile workers in North
Carolina.

By taking jobs in the mills, the LID directly unionized

the textile workers. (4)

The LID also engaged in the areas of civil

liberties and civil rights.

The organization provided legal aid to

Angelo Herndon (arrested in Alabama for distributing Communist
literature) and the Scottsboro Boys.(5)
Also in the 1930s, the student wing of the LID was formed.
The Intercollegiate LID was created in 1932 as an autonomous
appendage of the LID and became the Student League for Industrial
Democracy (SLID) in 1934.

During the Depression, the SLID

activities involved relief work, operating soup kitchens for
unemployed workers and striking miners and their families.

As

World War II intensified, the SLID protested campus ROTC and
impending direct American military involvement. (6) After the War,
the SLID opposed segregation, the postwar draft, and American
foreign policy favoring undemocratic governments.

The SLID

championed reforms such as the expansion of Social Security,
universal health insurance, and cooperative housing.

The SLID

also joined the LID in supporting the hardline liberal presidential
candidate Henry Wallace in 1948.(7)

7

The LID's postwar history was similar to that of the SLID.
During the general postwar prosperity of the fifties, the LID's
views shifted closer to the center of the political spectrum.
Instead of calling for anti-Stalinist/anti-totalitarian socialism,
the League favored a political system resembling that of a liberal
capitalist state.

Throughout the 1950s, the LID demanded

legislation on land conservation, public ownership of utilities,
national health insurance, public housing, national aid for
education, and migrant worker protection.(8)
A pamphlet written by Norman Thomas and published by the LID
in 1953, "Democratic Socialism:
new liberal approach.

A New Appraisal," represented the

In his essay, Thomas advocated national

health care, Social Security?expansion, and a progressive tax
policy.(9)

Thomas claimed that the current federal American

political system should be relied upon to institute these
and other social reforms; the progressivism of Franklin Roosevelt
and the Supreme Court -had put the United States in the direction
toward a socialist society, attainable by piecemeal reforms.(10)
In order to keep the U.S. on this road to socialism, democratic
socialists, according to Thomas, should capture the liberal wing of
the Democratic party.

Thomas indicated that Democratic

conservatives had impeded the party's progressive stance and
presented fellow Democrats and the American people with "no other
inspiration than warmed over New Dealism".(11)

Thomas

specifically declared in his essay that it was possible to
resurrect progressivism in the Democratic party by educating
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Democrats and American citizens of socialism.

Finally, Thomas

proclaimed that "the working class is not the Messiah which some of
us thought".

Democratic socialism should no longer rely on

the "masses," but on the existing "constitutional processes" to
achieve a socialist society in the United States.(12)

Michael

Harrington, organizer of the Young Peoples Socialist League (YPSLthe youth organization of the anti-stalinist socialist
Schachtmanites), heeded Thomas's call and focused his political
strategies on burrowing into the Democratic party in order to
move it to the left of liberalism.(131
When the SDS was founded in 1960, the LID was still attracted
to liberalism as the middle road to socialism.

The League called

for ending religious and racial discrimination, making political
institutions more accessible to the general public, and improving
and increasing Social Security and unemployment compensation.

The

LID also favored increased regulation of monopolies and aid to
underdeveloped countries.

And by the early 1960s, the LID focused

much attention on the effects of automation.

The debate on

automation, spurred by the new technology gained by World War Two,
obsessed the liberal, left, and labor wings of American politics
throughout the 1960s. (14)
After World War II, the LID returned to its original
educative approach, suggested by its original name, the ISS.

By

no longer publicly protesting American foreign policy (the LID was
strongly anti-communist by the 1950s) and supporting third party
presidential candidates--following Henry Wallace's 1948 campaign--
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the LID had moved to the margin of mainstream American politics.
This change in strategy may have been a result of the
progressivism of the thirties and forties which co-opted the
radicalism of the LID.

The softer approach might also have

been propagated in order to prevent their being identified with
revolutionary Soviet communism.

No matter what reason for the

watered-down Left, the LID and its SLID were weak and paralyzed
organizations.

The apparent stagnation of the LID and the SLID is

what inspired SLID member Robert (Al) Haber to revive the SLID and
transform it into the SDS.
In 1959, Al Haber, a graduate student at the University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor, planned the revival of the SLID as an active
student political organization.

In 1960, Haber perceived the

expanding civil rights movement as an opportunity to attract
northern students to a strong multi-issue organization.

In order

to gain attention of what would be the SDS and to express support
for blacks staging student sit-ins in the South, Haber and
fellow students Robert Ross, Sharon Jeffrey, and later Tom Hayden,
picketed in front of Kresge dimestores at the University of
Michigan in May 1960.(15)
From 1960 to 1962, the SDS continued to concentrate solely in
the area of civil rights--the most popular movement at the time.
The SDS advocated desegregation and equal rights for blacks in the
South by combining its resources with the radical student wing of
the civil rights movement, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC--"Snick"). SNCC believed that social change could
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be brought about only by directly confronting legislators and those
in charge of implementing repressive policies of discrimination and
segregation.

By participating with SNCC, the SDS learned first

hand the strategy of direct action and speculated that the tactic
used to confront an immutable structure could be applied to other
social issues.(16)
Hostilities between the SDS and the LID began in March 1961.
Haber was fired as president of the SDS by the LID for proposing
that the SDS become an active, rather than an educative,
organization by planning to send out a civil rights newsletter to
10,000 students.

The LID was first concerned with the SDS becoming

a mass organization for a variety of students who might not be
sympathetic to the LID's basic liberal and moderate principles.(17)
The LID also believed that if the SDS were to become an active
organization, the LID would likely lose its tax-exempt status as an
educational organization.(18)
Through the intercession of Norman Thomas and Haber's father,
LID member William Haber, Al Haber was reinstated as president in
May 1961.

Thomas criticized the LID'S paranoia of an active

student left and Haber's father reminded the League of the
importance of his son's idealistic youthfulness and sense of social
responsibility.(19)
A paper by Al Haber written shortly after he was allowed to
return to the SDS called for more independence from the parent
organization.

Haber specifically recommended that the SDS have

direct control over the election of the SDS staff and that the SDS
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have more freedom in its fundraising and financial affairs.
Overall, Haber urged that the LID be only a consultant to the SDS
and not be responsible for the SDS's activities.(20)

Perhaps,

under these circumstances, the LID and SDS could be affiliated
without jeopardizing the LID's tax-exempt status.

Regardless of

Haber's memorandum to the LID, the League continued direct control
over the SDS's activities, cautioning Haber from promoting and
organizing the SDS as a politically active group.
It was within this tense situation between the LID and the SDS
that the SDS drafted its first major policy manifesto. The Port
Huron Statement in 1962.

The manifesto was influenced by the SDS's

speculation that it

could shift the tactic of directaction used

for civil rights to

other issues if the SDS expandedits

perspective.

The Port Huron Statement thus expressed a multitude

of concerns of middle-class students and urged apathetic students
to confront issues such as civil rights, anticommunism, foreign
policy, social welfare, and America's "power elite."
One recommendation the SDS made in The Port Huron Statement
was that a full-scale civil rights program be implemented by the
federal government.

The SDS also urged

the government to publicly

denounce racism, support desegregation legislation, and use
the power of the executive office to persuade morally the American
people as well as the "Dixiecrats" to end all forms of
discrimination.(21)The SDS perceived that the pressure
"Dixiecrats" had forced the Democratic party to lose its
progressive identity.

According to the SDS, the southern

of the
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conservative Democrats had prevented many social reforms such as
civil rights.

By purging the party of Dixiecrats, the Democratic

party (the majority party in Congress) could approve a strong civil
rights platform and guarantee its passage in Congress.(22)
The Port Huron Statement also called for more active popular
participation in national politics..

The SDS criticized the current

American system which favored business and industry lobbies
representing only a small fraction of the population.

The

manifesto suggested organizing specific interest groups to act as
educative and politicizing: agents for the common citizens.

Such

organizations could then act as channels for those not associated
with a major lobby to articulate their needs and demands to the
federal government.(23)
The SDS claimed that common people possessed with a strong
voice to articulate their interests could successfully demand and
achieve sweeping social reforms.

The SDS indicated that reforms

were needed most in the areas of education, the penal system,
mental health, and poverty.

The SDS demanded a comprehensive

economic program which would attack structural problems related to
the causes of poverty.

The SDS recommended immediate anti-poverty

reforms in the areas of housing, medical aid, Social Security, and
minimum wage.(24)

The science community was also called on to

concentrate more on improving social welfare and health
rather than on defense.

The SDS criticized the government for

funding the development of new weapons to confront the perceived
military threat of the Soviet Union instead of supporting
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scientific research on health care.(25)
The imbalanced stress placed on defense research coupled with
inordinate military spending was unnecessary because the U.S.S.R.,
according to the SDS, had not been proven an expansionist and
threatening power.

Another result of America's misperception of

the Soviet foreign policy was that the United States often
militarily aided and defended post-colonial countries in order to
prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere.

The SDS recommended

that the United States aid the economic development of postcolonial nations through international agencies like the United
Nations rather than supply them with guns.(26)
Although the SDS stated clearly in its manifesto that it
opposed communism (mainly because of its domestic policy of
suppressing human rights), the SDS also opposed McCarthyism.

The

fear of Soviet expansion had encouraged a wave of anticommunism
which threatened basic American freedoms.

The "exaggerated"

communist threat restricted debate and forced citizens to accept a
conforming political doctrine designed to defend itself against a
so-called "demonic" enemy.

McCarthyism had prevented any serious

analysis and approach to U.S.-Soviet relations because it
contradicted the basic requirement of democracy, permission of
peaceful and loyal opposition.(27)
The Port Huron Statement also criticized the universities for
failing to facilitate social change.

Universities had defined

as their purpose to prepare students to "get by" and to fit into
the general society.

Universities were further hampered from
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acting as agents of social change by the imposing academic
bureaucracy.

The SDS stated that the university bureaucracy had

created a sense of powerlessness which conditioned students
to be indifferent and numb to society's problems and political
structure.
tolerance

Yet, because of their access to knowledge and
of various opinions, The Port Huron Statement claimed

that universities had great potential in engineering and conducting
a mass social movement. (28)
By its exhibition and criticism of America's social and
political shortcomings, The Port Huron Statement and the SDS had
made the point that the American Left needed to be revived.

This

"New" Left was to take on the role of immediately advocating the
overarching social and political reforms outlined in the manifesto.
The Old Left (the LID), however, did not embrace The Port Huron
Statement; in fact the League strongly opposed it.
In a secret Executive Committee session in early July 1962,
the LID accused the convention of being "unrepresentative" of the
LID and of operating outside the authority of the parent
organization and suspended the SDS's activities.

The SDS was

indefinitely, restrained from mailing or publishing their
literature and the LID refused to pay for materials pertaining to
the SDS's policies and political positions.

The LID subsequently

summoned Al Haber and Tom Hayden, the main authors of The Port
Huron Statement, to a hearing before the LID executive committee on
July 6. (29)
The first accusation at the hearing was introduced by
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committee member Harrington who charged the SDS with "united
frontism,11 the association with other Left organizations other than
the LID.(30)

The "united frontism" that Harrington referred to

was demonstrated by the presence of a member of the Progressive
Youth Organizing Committee (PYOC) , the youth wing of the Communist
party, at the June 1962 convention.(31)
"United frontism," according to Harrington, was threatening
because of its damaging results in the past.

The SLID experienced

"united frontism" when it amalgamated with the Communist party's
National Student League (NSL) in 1935, forming the American Student
Union (ASU). Even though the socialists and communists found their
ideologies different from each other, the two groups felt it was
necessary to unite in order to provide a more significant voice
against American intervention in World War II.

After the two

organizations merged to form the ASU, however, the Communists
continued to attack publicly and directly the ideas of the
Socialists.

After the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939 and the Soviet

invasion of Finland in 1940, the SLID faction of the ASU became
deeply disenchanted with their communist counterparts and left the
ASU.

Afterward, however, the SLID found itself in disarray.(32)
The presence of the member of the PYOC at the drafting of The

Port Huron Statement, however, was hardly a threat to the
organization and political strategy of the SDS.

The PYOC member in

question, Jim Hawley, was only seventeen and not even a cardcarrying member of the Communist party.(33)

The SDS granted

Hawley only observer status and he did not verbally participate.
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The SDS also felt that by not admitting Hawley into the convention,
the SDS would be betraying its own principles of working toward a
more open society which would encourage a variety of opinions and
allow peaceful opposition.(34)
Furthermore, it is possible that the SDS believed that they
were adhering to the advice of the LID regarding relations with
non-SDS members.

In a May 16-17, 1960 policy paper entitled "SDS

Statement of Goals," the SDS claimed that LID members Harrington
and Cy Landy suggested that the SDS "take under its wing"
autonomous "political clubs."

Landy and Harrington believed that

the presence of other leftist organizations would facilitate a
wider view of politics and social needs.

Landy and Harrington

did not restrict any specific organizations, but did mention the
YPSL (of which Harrington was a senior member) as a possible group
which the SDS should approach.(35)

Thus, such a nebulous stance

by the LID may have been perceived by the SDS as an indirect
allowance of (or at least indifference toward) association with
orthodox Communists.
The SDS did not fear a relationship with the Communists or
Communist infiltration because they were perceived as strict
adherents to an immutable authoritarian doctrine which had nothing
to do with participatory democracy or direct action.

The SDS could

not understand why the Communists would be interested in an
organization possessing a different ideology.(36)
Still, Tom Kahn of the Youth Progressive Socialist League,
also affiliated with the LID, was concerned that the SDS's loose
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connection with the LID, its absence of a clearly defined ideology,
and inexperience in dealing with Communists would encourage the
Communist party or a front organization to penetrate and subvert
the SDS. (37)

The LID was also concerned that the SDS might appear

communistic because of their relatively neutral stand on communism
in The Port Huron Statement. Although the SDS stated that they
despised the communist single-party state and its high degree of
top-down, state centralization, their stance was obscured by the
SDS's implication that the United States was the ultimate party at
fault in perpetuating the Cold War and by their claim that the
Soviet Union was not necessarily pursuing a policy of
expansion.(38)
The LID was inherently anticommunist since its origins in the
early 1900s.

The LID continued its anticommunism after World

War II and became more outspoken on the issue.

This may have been

due to the LID's own antitotalitarian ideology, but it is also
likely that the liberal organization feared being branded communist
in the McCarthyist fifties.

The interest of the LID to present

itself as a non-communist organization inadvertently caused the SDS
to view the LID and its positions similar to its red baiting
adversaries in the 1950s.
After the LID hearing on July 6, the committee (Vera Rony,
Richard Roman, Harry Fleischman, Emanuel Muravchak, and Harrington)
voted to allow the SDS to approve its manifesto, but deferred
the salaries of Haber (field secretary) and Hayden (president).
The LID now required that it issue final approval of all documents
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the SDS published.(39)

To further assert control over the SDS's

activities, the LID appointed a secretary responsible to the LID to
oversee daily operations of the SDS central office in New York
City.

The LID did not mention to Haber and Hayden that the LID

had also confiscated the SDS's mailing lists and changed the lock
on the SDS office door.(40)

Haber and Hayden appealed to the LID

on July 12 and were given back their office and severance pay was
considered.

But, the LID appointed secretary remained.(41)

The LID-SDS confrontation had revealed to Haber and Hayden
that the LID expected the SDS to serve as a student operated
duplicate of the parent organization. (42)

.

They believed that such

a relationship was undesirable because the SDS (especially Hayden)
concluded that the LID had become ineffective in confronting
current social problems.
SDS wanted to act.

The LID emphasized education, while the

Apparently the LID had adhered too closely to

its objective printed on the cover page of the LID pamphlets after
World War II:

"Education for,increasing democracy in our economic,

political, and cultural life."(43)
According to Hayden's appeal to the LID's lockout, the LID and
the SDS had entered into a relationship which had destroyed all
autonomy of the SDS.(44)

The confrontation with the LID

demonstrated to Haber and Hayden the LID's tight and arbitrary
control over the SDS.

By curbing the SDS's independence, the LID

appeared as repressive as the society which the students were
attempting to change.

Furthermore, the SDS perceived the LID's

control as inhibiting the freedom of the SDS which was necessary to
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revive the American Left.
Although they resented the LID's approach to social reform and
their direct control over their organization, the SDS wished to
remain affiliated with the League.

The student organization

believed that the experience and knowledge of the LID members would
be helpful to the progress of their own work.

The SDS felt that

opposing ideas should be encouraged because such discussion would
yield the impression that change was taking place and that the Left
was once again active.(45)
Yet, the SDS implied that a separation between the two would
be most desirable.

By abandoning its direct relationship with the

LID, the SDS would have the maximum freedom to explore its own
solutions to social and political problems.

Hayden stated in his

appeal to the LID, "We do not choose to discuss the problems of our
era in the pre-ordained language of our fathers."(46)
There were two Old Lefts.

The one prior to World War II was

active and aggressively advocated immediate radical socialist
reforms.

The Old Left of the fifties was an ineffective

organization which pursued moderate and single-issue reforms
which were also conveniently supported by liberal elements of the
Democratic party.

This postwar Left was rejected by the New Left

of the early sixties in favor of the Left similar to that of the
thirties.

Tensions between the New Left and Old Left first became

obvious during the 1962 conflict between the SDS and the LID.
New Left was disaffected by the left of postwar era which,
according to the SDS, had been co-opted by the Establishment

The

and neutralized.

The struggle between the elements of the New Left

and Old Left shaped and influenced the development of the SDS by
the SDS's rejection of certain ideas and strategies of the LID.
The spurning of ideas of the postwar Old Left would especially
become apparent in the goals and strategies of the SDS1s
Economic Research and Action Project.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND ACTION PROJECT
One of the first activities of consequence of the SDS was the
Economic Research and Action Project, ostensibly created in
response to the "discovery" of poverty in the late fifties and
early sixties.

The overall strategy of ERAP was to have college

students live among and politically organize the poor in northern
cities in order to demand aid and fundamental social reforms from
the federal government.
from 1963 to 1965.

The SDS supported this ambitious project

From 1965 through 1967, ERAP chapters operated

independently from the SDS.

Throughout its four year history, ERAP

gradually departed from its original purposes, strategies, and
goals.

ERAP evolved from a project based on enacting social reform

through education and research to a program which emphasized direct
action and experimentation with participatory democracy.

The

changes in the ERAP program demonstrate also the rejection of the
principles and tactics of the Old Left represented by the LID.
The idea of initiating an anti-poverty project originated
at the June 7-30, 1963, National Convention at Pine Hill, New York.
At this meeting, the SDS drafted America and the New Era.

Its

second statement defined SDS's mission more closely and discussed
the problem of poverty and liberalism's futile attempts in dealing
21
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with it.

According to the document, token governmental reforms,

such as Kennedy's Area Redevelopment Act, failed to produce
radical, fundamental changes capable of improving American economic
and social structures.

State liberalism had abandoned its populist

and progressive platform and now favored the elite and private
industry.

Liberalism had sacrificed genuine reforms for its self-

interest in preserving the current system.

America and the New

Era, therefore, called for a formal rejection of alliances with the
liberal establishment and a re-creation of a popular Leftist
opposition which would prevent itself from being co-opted by the
elite. (1)

The opposition to the government's liberal welfare and

social domestic policies, loosely described in the SDS's 1963
statement, formed the basis of the Economic Research and Action
Project.
America and the New Era suggested a community based program
to organize the poor in slums, intended especially to reach
underprivileged and unemployed youth.

The program would also

conduct analysis on community economic conditions.

From such

analysis, a political approach would be devised by the community
itself.

Only by a system of participatory democracy could basic

social, political, and economic reforms be attained.(2)
The foundation for a community based economic project was laid
at the SDS 1963 National Council Meeting in Bloomington, Indiana,
two days after the August 28 "March on Washington for Jobs and
Freedom."

At the August 30 to September 1 meeting, the SDS

announced that the United Auto Workers had presented the students

23

with $5,000 for one year and access to UAW publication facilities.
The grant was intended to help initiate a program to study and
accentuate economic problems in American cities--a goal similar to
the program described in America and the New Era.

The UAW also

expected the project to raise poverty issues on campuses and build
a strong relationship between students and adult labor unions which
had been negatively associated with big business by the SDS.(3)
In order to apply.the funding to its intended purpose, Tom
Hayden, 1963 SDS president, organized the Economic Research and
Action Project, headed by Al Haber.

Haber opened ERAP's main

office at the University of Michigan and, in fall 1963, University
of Michigan sophomore Joe Chabot was sent to Chicago to initiate
ERAP's first chapter.

Chabot's work focused on organizing

unemployed white youths, however, Chabot found Chicago youths
uninterested in a community action program.

Still, Chabot opened

a JOIN (Jobs or Income Now) office four doors away from the
Uptown unemployment office where Chabot and fellow SDSer
Steve Max handed out leaflets listing available social and legal
services.(4)
That same fall, the Student Political Action Committee
(SPAC) at Swarthmore College also worked on organizing the
poor, although SPAC was at that time unaffiliated with ERAP.

SPAC

joined with the NAACP sponsored Committee For Freedom Now (CFFN) in
mobilizing residents of Chester, Pennsylvania to protest against
overcrowded and dilapidated Franklin Elementary School.

According

to the February 1964 ERAP Newsletter, when the school was built in
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1912, it was designed for 500 students.

However, in 1963, the same

building held 1100 pupils and was in a state of disrepair.

In

November 1963, a boycott of the school was organized in which 400
students participated.

SPACers, students from Bryn Mawr College,

the CFFN, and residents staged three days of demonstrations which
included blocking the school's entrance and seizing Chester's city
hall, resulting in the arrests of 241 people.

Still, the school

board and city officials did agree to repair facilities at Franklin
Elementary and to transport the overflow of students to other
schools.

The school board also made plans for the gradual closing

of the school.

The CFFN, headed by Stanley Branche, executive

secretary of the Chester NAACP, remained organized in order to
campaign for other public needs such as adequate medical care, full
employment, and renovated low-cost housing.(5)
From September to December 1963, ERAP had no overall
definitive strategy in dealing with the poor and unemployed.
Instead, it attempted to create a plan by experimenting directly
with community action movements.

Still,

Haber, attempted to

outline ERAP's goals and strategy in Ann Arbor.

Haber

conceptualized ERAP as a program which should focus mainly on
mobilizing university students rather than on the ghettoes.(6)
Haber wanted ERAP to provide a speaker service and to sponsor
conferences on poverty to educate students who would then support
anti-poverty causes.

He also planned to have ERAP work with civil

rights and peace organizations by supplying them with information
obtained by ERAP's research.(7)

As an action project, Haber
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recommended that ERAP develop a strong alliance between radicals
and progressive labor unions and to organize (but not participate
in) projects favoring higher minimum wage laws, job training, and
rent strikes.

ERAP would also sponsor programs for student welfare

on campuses, such as student tenant unions.(8)
By basing its operations at universities and making its
presence known to campuses, ERAP would be in a favorable position
to act as an agent for radicalizing students and making them more
socially conscious.

By doing so, ERAP would create what Haber

called "radical professionals" who would continue their work in
reform after they graduated.(9)

Haber's radical vision of the

direction of the American "Left" truly made it "new" and distinct
from the Old Left.
ERAP was reassessed at the December 27-31, 1963 National
Conference in New York.

There it was revealed that not everyone

shared Haber's opinion that ERAP should operate mainly on campuses.
Hayden and Todd Gitlin, SDS president from 1963 to 1964, argued
that ERAP should take on a strong active role in the society at
large, similar to the work of Joe Chabot in Uptown Chicago.(10)
As expected, Haber presented the argument that ERAP should be used
to create radical professionals by concentrating on social
research, writing on poverty, and formulating strategies for non
students.

Hayden's vision of ERAP resembled that of the work of

SNCC, in which SNCC workers lived among poor blacks in "freedom
houses" in the South.

Hayden (an ex-SNCC worker) suggested that

students live among the poor in the North.

His emphasis on direct
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action over intellectualism was also caused by the urgency of the
plight of the poor in the early 1960s.

Hayden claimed that

students could be more successful in not only research, but also by
improving the condition of the poor by working and living with
them. (11)

Hayden's argument and pessimistic view of the university

as an unlikely agent for social activism was actually a direct
expression of the SDS's opinion that the university system was
incapable of facilitating reform.
The December conference voted to approve the ERAP program of
living among and actively mobilizing the poor.

The rejection of

Haber's position was advanced by the election of Rennie Davis as
ERAP's head. (12)

In the upcoming summer of 1964, the SDS planned

to locate projects in northern cities which would form grass-roots
models of participatory democracy to articulate economic and
political needs from the federal government.
To launch the new direct approach of ERAP, Tom Hayden and Carl
Wittman drafted "An Interracial Movement of the Poor?" in early
1964.

Wittman, a student at Swarthmore College, had led the ERAP-

type program in Chester, fall 1963.

Wittman and Hayden based

their essay on a tactic suggested by Michael Harrington in The
Other America (1962) . Harrington (as well as Wittman and Hayden)
declared that economic changes would most likely occur if northern
poor urban blacks and whites were mobilized into an integrated
union.

It was expected that an organized union of whites and

blacks would create a strong political voice to force a
comprehensive national anti-poverty program beneficent to all
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races.(13)

Harrington argued that poor whites would not be inhibited by
their prejudices once they realized they confronted the same enemy
of blacks, the American economic system.

Poor, unskilled, white

laborers, antagonistic toward blacks, were under the impression
that civil rights victories and equal opportunity meant that blacks
would take jobs traditionally reserved for whites.

These lower-

class whites needed to understand that minorities did not threaten
their jobs as much as the rising tide of automation. (14)

Wittman

and Hayden expanded the interracial concept by considering problems
such a union might encounter and by offering concrete organizing
plans.
Aware that poor whites with racist attitudes might find union
with blacks difficult, Hayden and Wittman recommended that ERAP
volunteers organize programs in neighborhoods encouraging common
economic identification between members of the two races.

Hayden

and Wittman claimed that if poor whites and blacks worked together
in community programs race would be seen as a diversionary issue
which distracted the poor from the actual economic issues.(15)
Another potential obstacle concerning an interracial movement
and a community based anti-poverty union was the lack of leadership
available among the poor.

ERAP hoped that by eliciting leadership

qualities from select members at ERAP's community union meetings,
leaders of a movement would emerge.

Leadership could be invoked by

holding meetings with the poor to discuss their condition and to
instruct them on articulating their needs and interests.

Hayden
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and Wittman noted in their essay that such community unions were
mainly supposed to serve as a means to exert pressure nationally
and not to be ends in themselves.(16)

ERAP intended community

unions to practice experimental participatory democracy enabling
the poor with a strong political voice.

The practice of

participatory democracy would then form the foundation for changing
the American political structure.

Participatory democracy would be

validated by the moral and social goals it would achieve.(17)
ERAP volunteers would initiate their participatory democratic
program by knocking on doors of apartments and houses and recording
the needs and concerns of neighborhood residents and by informing
tenants of the weekly ERAP neighborhood meeting. (18)

The community

union meetings, initially conducted by the students, disregarded
formal rules of order and decided on programs and policy positions
by consensus.

The intention was to create leadership that would

eventually enable residents to organize and run a popular local
democracy themselves.

The Chicago JOIN project shifted its.

authority to the poor almost completely by fall 1965.

Not only was

a local resident made chairman of JOIN, but the community union,
according to JOIN,

now practiced participatory democracy.(19)

JOIN'S concept of participatory democracy in 1965 did not mean
that each person had one vote.

People's interests were represented

by each individual's direct material interest at stake on each
issue; if a resident's interests were not directly threatened, his
vote and opinion would be less influential than that of a resident
whose concerns were more closely related to the issue in
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question.(20)

It might be argued that JOIN favored an interest-

group democracy similar to that which they opposed at large by
granting a larger proportion of representation to those with higher
assets in order to prevent residents who had no interests at stake
from controlling the debate and the program.

But this interest-

favoring practice of democracy was still different from the system
criticized in the Port Huron Statement, since it was on a local
scale, because there was not a wide gap in incomes which would
necessarily cause one individual to dominate the organization, and
because it was understood by the members that the purpose of
community union was to practice a fair democratic system and
improve the welfare of the residents at large rather than that of
a single individual.

It should also be remembered that overall

assets were not considered when determining one's interest in an
issue, rather the level of assets immediately in question on a
particular issue.

Another alteration in 1965 was that chairmen

were elected for one month, giving all members the opportunity for
leadership experience.

Furthermore, the policies of the organizing

committee, comprised of those who were actively involved, had to be
agreed on by the non-active attenders at the meeting.

This policy

helped to expand community involvement.(21)
SDSer Steve Max's May 1964 essay, "Words, Butter, No Parsnips:
Remarks on the Nature of community Organizing," provided organizers
with a more precise strategy and purpose of ERAP.

In the short

term, community unions were to confront immediate sources of
exploitation, mainly slumlords.

To do so, Max suggested community
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unions organize rent strikes and picket apartment buildings and
landlord offices.

By working together in non-political struggles

to achieve a specific goal, a politicized union would be created.
Max predicted that once the community union had been politicized,
it would attack more remote sources of exploitation by the local
and federal government.

The expectation was that the politicized

community union which had created a prefigurative government would
replace the power of local and federal authorities.(22)

ERAP

chapters often disagreed on the degree of emphasis to place on non
political short-term goals and long-term national political goals,
leaving either of these approaches open for adoption by the various
ERAP chapters in the first summer of ERAP in 1964.
When it developed onto a national scale in 1964, ERAP had 150
student members and chapters in Chicago, Boston, Baltimore,
Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Newark, Chester, and Hazard
(Appalachian Kentucky).

In the course of its four-year

history, it also claimed chapters in Roxbury (Massachusetts), New
Brunswick and Hudson County (New Jersey), San Francisco, Cairo
(Illinois), Cedar Hills (Maryland) and Knoxville, Tennessee.(23)
ERAP chapters adopted either the JOIN approach and organized
neighborhoods around fundamental economic problems or formed
community unions which confronted immediate issues like housing and
traffic safety.
In 1964, JOIN stressed national problems of unemployment,
foreign competition, and automation.(24)

To express its national

perspective, JOIN accentuated the crisis of poverty by selling
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apples (a popular image of the Depression) in downtown Chicago and
at a Pete Seeger concert.

JOIN hoped to remind people that a

national and widespread "Great Depression" existed for millions of
Americans.

Apple selling as well as handing out leaflets on

current economic problems at the nearby unemployment office, gained
press attention and attracted people interested in community action
which President Johnson had called for in his public announcement
of the War on Poverty early in 1964.(25)
By the end of summer 1964, the unemployment rate began to
fall, making it difficult to exploit the jobs issue to rally the
poor.

Therefore, the tactics of the Chicago project went the way

of the Newark Community Union Project (NCUP--"En-Cup) and began
organizing the poor around immediate local issues regarding health
care, recreation, schools, and housing.

To represent this shift in

objectives, JOIN opened a second office in Chicago's heavily
dilapidated Southside.(26)

Rennie Davis suggested that JOIN adopt

the strategy which he would later advocate in his 1965 essay, "The
War on Poverty:

Notes on an Insurgent Response."

Davis

recommended that JOIN practice de facto activism.^ For example,
JOIN should repair a street and present the bill to Mayor Daley or
repair an apartment and withhold rent until the landlord reimbursed
tenants for materials and labor.(27)
The Chicago project never became as radical as Davis had
hoped.

Yet, the ERAP Newsletter reported it conducted

strikes and petitioned for a day care center.(28)

rent

In June 1965,

fifteen JOIN members picketed a Chicago welfare office over the
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missed payments of Dorothy Peress.

The office realized its error,

but refused to grant full retroactive payments to Peress. Three
students and Peress consequently staged a sit-in at the office and
were arrested.(29)
JOIN also picketed the Urban Progress Center to protest Mayor
Daley's Commission to administer War on Poverty funds because it
had no representation of the poor.(30)

This action was

particularly important because "urban renewal" was being considered
for the Uptown neighborhood.

JOIN supported "urban renewal if it

meant better housing and jobs for those already living in the
community, but such a successful "urban renewal" was unlikely
without representation of local residents.

It was more than likely

that the area would be renovated to suit the needs of upper-income
citizens.(31)

Thus, despite JOIN1s efforts, "urban renewal" plans

proceeded in Chicago's Uptown.
NCUP did not evolve or decline from a national to local
interest organization like JOIN.
short-term local goals.

NCUP began and ended its focus on

As with JOIN, NCUP began by opening up a

store-front office from which it handed out leaflets announcing
meetings, demonstrations, lists of tenant rights, and places for
legal assistance.(32)

However, NCUP's programs to empower local

neighborhoods were intended to build a movement which would work
for immediate results, rather than for national reforms.
A local issue NCUP dealt with was the brutal treatment by the
police of the Clinton Hill neighborhood where NCUP was based.

In

summer 1964, The Hunterdon Block Club, organized by NCUP, arranged
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a picketing of one hundred people at the local police station.

In

winter 1965, sixteen residents picketed a "Klein's" department
store after it was reported to ERAP that a store detective beat
Clyde Wright, accused of shoplifting.(33)
NCUP1s most popular movement on a local scale was to have the
city erect a traffic light at an intersection in Clinton Hill.
According to Tom Hayden, one of NCUP's leaders, the traffic light
issue was a symbol of other problems of the city.(34)

By

galvanizing residents around a definitive and immediate issue, NCUP
hoped.the neighborhood would undergo radicalization necessary .to
confront more difficult and abstract goals such as local
representation on area poverty boards and increased national antipoverty funding.

Hayden recalled in his autobiography that the day

after a protest of which 200 people participated, ten NCUP members,
comprised of nine local residents and Hayden, were invited to meet
with Deputy Mayor Paul Reilly.

Reilly told the group that a survey

and study would have to be initiated before a permanent traffic
light could be installed.

Two days later, John Barnes, a

representative of the Newark machine councilman Irvine Turner,
notified Hayden and a Clinton Hill resident that the light would be
erected.(35)
As a result of protests organized by NCUP, Hayden claimed that
local residents began to feel a sense of political power.

If this

was the case, NCUP successfully achieved its goal of creating "a
group of people with no previous political connections . . .

to

speak and act without being embarrassed or dependent on the higher
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ups. 11(36)

The SDS believed that protests regarding police

brutality and traffic safety developed a ^public capable of directly
voicing their needs and representing themselves.

According to

Hayden, NCUP encouraged its block organizations to attend local
area poverty board meetings where they successfully expressed their
needs such as a communitytbased service center.

At the center,

attorneys would be available to tenants who could represent them
against corrupt landlords. (37)

Still, the best way for the poor to

articulate their needs was by electing local representatives to
area poverty boards.
NCUP helped facilitate local representation by passing a
motion at an area poverty board meeting in Clinton Hill requiring
board members to be poor themselves.

NCUP consequently elected a

slate of its members to the board by a two-thirds majority in June
1965 which brought Clinton Hill such accomplishments as the
aforementioned service center.

NCUP's greatest representation

achievement was in fall 1965 when resident Bessie Smith was elected
as a city wide trustee of Newark's anti-poverty program.(38)
Despite its marginal successes, NCUP, as well as JOIN, did not
achieve its goal of an interracial movement.

This was mainly

because the chapters were located in segregated areas of cities.
Research by the SDS before the Newark project inaccurately revealed
that Clinton Hill was 65% black, 10% Puerto Rican, and 25% white
(East European) . (39)

ERAP discovered after moving into poor areas

that an overwhelming majority of chapters were in black
neighborhoods.

But, even in more racially mixed sections like
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Chicago's Uptown where Puerto Ricans and whites from depressed
Appalachia co-existed, unity was thwarted by ethnic and racial
groups who often blamed each other for their economic problems.
According to Casey Hayden, who studied Chicago's ERAP from 1964
/

through 1965, interracial organizing was difficult because there
was no immediate successful model of racial unity as a means to
achieving economic progress.(40)
Another difficulty in organizing the poor was that many
residents had just moved into poor communities or were transients.
Therefore, it was unlikely for such people (many from Appalachia)
to feel a part of the community.

Residents might ask why they

should bother working to get a recreation center if one might be
moving out at any time to find available or better work.(41)
Wini Breines1s study of ERAP in The Great Refusal:
Community Organization in the New Left. 19 62-1968. accused the
traditional political inactivity of the poor for failing to make
ERAP a success.

Citing Frances Fox-Piven and Richard Cloward's

Poor People Movements, she claimed that building an organization
for poor people was not seen as useful to many neighborhoods since,
previously, the poor had achieved more (from their perspective)
through violence than through legal and political means.(42)
Inherent problems of the poor were compounded by the
students'

(all in their twenties) inexperience of living in a

ghetto while trying to relate with the poor and their needs.
Looking back at ERAP, Hayden revealed that "None of my reading or
class work prepared me for the economic realities or . . . the real
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operations of political machines.11(43)

The inexperience of the

students also made it difficult for them to mobilize the poor as an
active force.

Students as well as community residents were

generally unable to penetrate local and national governmental
structures.

The SDS was forced to realize that governmental

bureaucracy was too powerful and removed from its citizens to
generate any comprehensive reforms.(44)
It can also be argued that the participatory democracy
approach actually hindered ERAP's success.

The anti-bureaucratic

perspective of the students transferred onto the poor prevented
a strong leadership from emerging in individual chapters.(45)
Thus, one reason for the failures of JOIN could have been that it
tried to make everyone a leader.
wanted to direct the project.

Everyone in the community union

Since everyone was a leader, it was

difficult to build a consensus on the issues.

Students as well as

neighborhood residents were emotionally and physically exhausted
from trying to get everyone to agree on a strategy or goal.(46)
The uncertainty as to whether ERAP should emphasize dealing
with poverty or experimenting with participatory democracy left
many students confused as to their own purpose for working in ERAP.
Such a situation contributed to the demoralization of students who
tried often unsuccessfully to interest residents in ERAP.

Todd

Gitlin recalled, "I hated knocking on doors trying to entice people
into an organization difficult to explain."(47)
Organizing was also difficult because students idealized the
lower-class 1s self-awareness and power potential.

Not only did

37

condescending attempts to create leadership produce guilt among
students, who felt they were manipulating the poor, but the lack of
substantial results shattered unrealistic expectations, damaging
ERAP's morale.(48)
Morale was also affected by the poor's indifference toward
forming community unions.

ERAP's newsletters reported low

attendance at ERAP meetings and at demonstrations.

In areas where

ERAP was supposedly building a strong power base, the lack of
interest in rallies and protests was particularly disillusioning.
In fall 1964, only two people showed up for an "urban renewal"
rally in Chester where only a year before the community staged a
successful protest and boycott.

Also, in 1964, the Chicago JOIN

project reported attendances as low as six people at its weekly
community union meetings.

But in the previous fall, Joe Chabot

claimed that everyday twenty-five people entered the JOIN office to
discuss problems of welfare and employment.(49)
In his autobiography, Reunion:

A Memoir. Hayden stressed the

marginal interest of the poor and how that had a negative impact on
ERAP’s enthusiasm.

One would have to visit 150 residences in order

to get ten people to a community meeting.

Although Hayden recalled

his work in Newark as a minor success, it could never be considered
a model of participatory democracy since most of the community was
not involved.(50)

Wini Breines, in The Great Refusal. claimed that

one basic reason the poor were uninterested was that they
understood their lack of power more than the students.

Unless

the poor had some political leverage (a significant number of
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registered voters or money), no one in government would listen to
them.

As Harrington wrote in The Other America, citing John

Kenneth Galbraith, the current poor was the first group of lower
classes that the politicians could leave alone and be elected to
office. (51)

Thus, without any power or material resources to play

the games of politics, the poor found no reason to organize.
What also contributed to the students' lack of zeal in ERAP
were the living conditions to which the middle-class students
subjected themselves.

Student volunteers at ERAP chapters lived,

ate, and slept together in the same residence.

Such strains on

privacy were compounded by near conditions of malnutrition.

One

wonders how long one NCUP member could attest that each member was
"eating quite well for 70 cents a day."(52)
Another problem with the ERAP organization was that students
were only available for two or three months in the summer.

In such

a short time span, it was difficult to commit oneself to a
particular community and bring about results.

ERAP reported that

only one-third of its membership stayed on after the summer.
But, the JOIN organizers believed that individuals would have to
devote two to five whole years to the project in order to have an
impact on a community.(53)
ERAP's enthusiasm was also hindered by attacks by local police
and community members.

Although neighborhood residents rarely

physically attacked ERAP workers, ERAP was often harassed by the
police and landlords.

In 1964, an ERAP Newsletter reported that

Hayden was arrested in Newark for battery of a female landlord who
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was the object of a rent strike. He was released when the landlord
could not identify the accused.(54)

Also in that same fall, on

October 6, an ERAP organizer in Hazard, Kentucky reported that
shots had been fired at the office of ERAP's chapter--Appalachian
Committee for Full Employment. (55)

On June 24, 1965, the Chicago

vice-squad arrested twelve members of JOIN and one juvenile staying
in their apartment.

Two were charged with having a disorderly

house, possession of.illicit drugs, and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor.

Ten were charged with disorderly conduct

and being inmates of a disorderly house.
juvenile delinquency authorities.

The minor was sent to

According to the ERAP Newsletter

which reported the incident, the police had no search warrant and
the barbiturates found had been planted by the police.

Although

all charges were dropped for insufficient evidence, the arrest was
published in major papers like the Chicago Daily News, giving JOIN
an unhealthy reputation among the community.

Such acts against

chapters damaged ERAP's reputation as well as its members'
morale.(56)
Another cause of the eventual termination of ERAP was the
emerging opposition to the Vietnam War.

Not only did the war and

the draft affect students more immediately than inner city poverty,
but the goal of ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam was more clear.
Students were drawn to the Vietnam issue also because it was less
experimental.

Students knew what had to be done and how to

approach it by looking to elder pacifists like A.J. Muste and Dave
Dellinger and to previous anti-war movements in the United
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States...(57)
The decline of ERAP was accelerated in March 1965 by the
dissolution of the National Office.

From then on ERAP chapters

operated independently of the ultimate direction of the SDS.

The

SDS withdrew its support of ERAP because of its preoccupation with
Vietnam and because the newer members of the SDS gaining control of
the SDS wanted to bring the SDS back to the campuses.

ERAP

organizers also agreed that .a centralized office had impeded the
independence needed to create programs designed for particular
chapters.

ERAP organizers also may have believed that the

centralized organization made the poor feel less powerful, since
(like the local government) ERAP chapters were only a small part of
a remote organization.(58)
However, not all ERAP organizers agreed on the dissolution.
To some, decentralization meant that each chapter would have to
take on national functions, such as recruiting student members,
funding projects, and providing resources needed to research and
mobilize the needs of the community.

These functions were

previously reserved by the ERAP National Office in Ann Arbor.

ERAP

chapters also lost their identification as part of a national
organization, consequently forcing all projects to concentrate on
local and immediate reforms.

Because each project now bore a

greater responsibility and sought fewer radical goals than it
had only a year or two earlier, membership and morale dwindled.

As

a consequence of the decentralization of ERAP and the general
disillusionment of the program, individual chapters voluntarily
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shut down,

the Chicago JOIN project was the last to close, ceasing

operations in February 1968.(59)
Although ERAP itself was a failure, it had some long-term
effects on cities and the student movement.

Besides helping to

provoke a self-awareness of their potential political power, ERAP
helped to build a power base of poor and black inner city eligible
voters whom officials would have to recognize in order to be
elected.

For .example, Kirkpatrick Sale in SDS attributed the

election of Newark's Mayor Kenneth Gibson in 1970 to the
mobilization of blacks by NCUP. (60.):: ERAP introduced radicalism not
only to local residents, but to ERAP students as well.

After

projects folded, several members joined local anti-poverty, anti
gang organizations and the Great Society's VISTA (Volunteers In
Service To America).(61)

ERAP also helped to popularize the SDS

and increase its membership through its widespread national
operations.

After ERAP, the anti-bureaucratic radicalism of ERAP

members was transferred to inciting confrontations with the
university power structure and the military-industrial complex. (62)
The failure of ERAP marked the last time the New Left
would cooperate with postwar state liberalism.

ERAP organizers

became frustrated by their attempts at testing the limits of
American pluralism.

Although the SDS hardly expected the Johnson

administration to respond to the needs of the poor articulated by
ERAP, the actual lack of interest by the liberals revealed the
empty promises of the "Great Society."

Thus after ERAP, the SDS

was more resolute in fulfilling the goals of The Port Huron
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Statement and America and the New Era which questioned the
validity of postwar state sponsored liberalism. (63)
The overall execution of ERAP's strategies, and goals
also indicated the active assertion of the New Left as an
organization distinct from the Old Left.

By examining the

philosophy and purpose of ERAP, differences between the Old Left
and New Left are revealed.

This aspect of ERAP will be explored

in-depth in the following chapter.
ERAP was the first active project which the SDS operated
completely by itself.
much optimism.

Because it was its first project, there was

This optimism was fueled in part by the idealism of

the early sixties, as well as by The Port Huron Statement and
America and the New Era. Consequently, ERAP attempted to achieve
unrealistic goals.

Even though ERAP;is historically viewed as a

failure, the program can also be perceived as a success in the
broader context of the SDS and the New Left.

ERAP generated

radicalism in the SDS and, as we shall see in the next chapter, it
helped create an independent and thus "New" Left.

CHAPTER III

ELEMENTS OF THE OLD LEFT REJECTED BY ERAP
ERAP's purposes and strategies expressed the differences
between the SDS and the LID.

Although the SDS did not purposely

use ERAP to act as a vehicle to separate itself from the LID,
it can certainly be argued that ERAP's strategies, goals, and
organization displayed a growing chasm between the parent
organization and its offspring.

As ERAP continued on a

comprehensive level up to mid-196.5, it became more and more
apparent that the SDS was essentially embarking on an independent
course.
The most obvious difference between the LID and the SDS
exhibited by ERAP concerned the educative and active approaches to
facilitating social change.

When ERAP began, many SDS members

favored direct activism over the LID's educative tactic.

But the

LID's focus on educating the public and the Democratic party on
social issues and possible solutions was still shared by the
original early SDS president and 1963 director of ERAP, A1 Haber.
Haber's interest in using the SDS as an educative
organization was influenced (if not reinforced) by his 1961
conflict with the LID over his plan to send out a civil rights
newsletter, perceived by the LID as a tactic to convert the SDS
43
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into an active organization.

Another interpretation is that Haber

sincerely wanted to contain the SDS's activity and prevent it from
becoming a high-profiled force on the Left.

Haber hoped that the

SDS would become an educating agent to radicalize students who
would continue their liberal and, to a lesser extent, radical
politics when they graduated and entered their professions.

In

opposition to Haber, Tom Hayden perceived the SDS as a potentially
active and radical organization which should participate directly
in American politics.

Whether ERAP was to adopt an educative

strategy or a program which emphasized direct action was determined
at the December 1963 National Conference.
Haber favored an organization which would focus its efforts on
educating and radicalizing university students.

At the December

Conference, Haber argued his anti-activist position with Hayden who
represented those favoring a participative approach.

Overall,

Haber claimed that an activist program could not depend on
necessary widespread support from a coalition of blacks, labor, and
liberals.

According to Haber, this was because the American Left

at that time was small and insignificant.

Haber predicted that

ERAP could eventually become an active organization and help build
a strong national Left only after it had educated students,
researched community economic problems, and developed a plan to
mobilize individual neighborhoods.(1)

Haber also believed that

the limited resources of the SDS hindered ERAP's ability to fulfill
a wide range of goals which included student participation in
community unions.

ERAP would have to "prioritize" its work.
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According to Haber, The SDS's resources could be most productive if
ERAP worked at reinforcing the Left and recruited those likely to
be interested in ERAP.
Haber believed that it would be better in the long term to
build a foundation of student radicals and then radicalize the
general public.

He recommended that the ERAP National Office in

Ann Arbor provide educational materials and program orientation for
local chapters, explore areas in need of new ERAP chapters, recruit
new members, sponsor conferences on poverty, and publish research
papers on poverty.

Haber felt that ERAP's relationship with the

SDS should be to recruit people to the SDS and aid non-SDS groups
doing work supported by the SDS.

ERAP could help the SDS

reactivate the American Left by building a relationship with local
labor and civil rights groups, and by adopting the SDS's mode of
participatory democracy and have such a system serve as a model for
community union meetings.(2)
Hayden, however, argued that the urgency of the depressed
condition of the poor made it necessary for students to participate
in and facilitate direct action movements within urban communities.
Hayden also justified the pro-activist stance by invoking America
and the New Era (approved by both Hayden and Haber).

The 1963

document stated that the SDS was to take an active role in being
one of many agencies of social change.

This "new insurgency" of

the SDS was to force the breakdown of "mainstream institutions." (3)
Hayden considered Haber's plan too dependent on the current
political structures, namely state sponsored liberalism.

Hayden
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claimed that if ERAP operated outside the bounds of existing
political institutions, co-optation by liberals would be thwarted.
Radicalism would also keep ERAP from becoming an organization
advocating only limited and token (liberal) reforms.

Yet,

according to Haber, Hayden's vision of an active ERAP lacked a
long-term perspective as well as a clear program.

But, Hayden

claimed that if the program were to take a radical position from
the beginning, a "revolutionary trajectory" would be created.
"Tokenism" would be staved off by an autopilot-type project which
would constantly progress and generate other reform movements.(4)
In an SDS Bulletin essay, published March 1964, Haber
presented his interpretation of America and the New Era to justify
his position.

Haber also perceived his plan for ERAP to be in

accordance with America and the New Era which declared that the
research and development of a clear-cut plan was to precede any
mass action.

Haber was very concerned that before any direct

action be executed, an organized plan and defined set of goals
be developed.

He stated in his March 1964 reply to Todd Gitlin's

"President's Report," "Action is not radical because its form is
different or gutsy.

It is radical because goals and perspectives

are shared by its participants."(5)
The result of the 1963 National Conference's "Haber versus
Hayden" debate was a twenty to six vote in favor of Hayden.

The

December conference also elected Rennie Davis as new director of
ERAP.

Thus, ERAP embarked on a course which emphasized direct

action and radical activity in poor communities, facilitated by
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students recruited by the SDS.(6)

Gitlin attempted to reconcile

the two approaches in his April 1964 "President's Report."

Gitlin

argued that since the federal government recognized poverty as a
major national issue, expressed by President Lyndon Johnson's
announcement of his War on Poverty, ERAP must directly participate
in Community Action Projects in order to press for domestic reforms
and to test the liberals' actual interest in eradicating poverty.
Yet, Gitlin also agreed with Haber's position that the SDS should
consider the concept of generating radicalism among professionals.
However, Gitlin reminded his readers that not all those involved in
the SDS wished to pursue professional careers.

There were students

and ex-students who chose to continue to work indefinitely in the
areas of social and political reform.

Thus, Gitlin argued that the

SDS should concentrate most of its resources on the needs of the
general society.(7)

ERAP assumed a program obviously stressing

action over education and research; the idea of radical professions
was never strongly considered and was buried, along with ERAP, by
1965 as a consequence of the Vietnam issue.
Hayden's insistence on ERAP as an activist organization was
not only contrary to Haber's opinion, but to the LID's as well.

By

becoming an active political participant, however, the SDS had
actually moved closer to the strategies of the LID and the SLID of
the 1930s.

Yet, in the era of postwar liberalism and in the wake

of McCarthyism, the LID hesitated to rock the boat.

The LID elders

were especially alarmed by the thought of an activist left-wing
movement related to the LID and led by inexperienced students.
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Regardless of the concerns of the LID, the SDS's direct action
approach adopted by ERAP was applied to other movements such as
Vietnam.

By using direct action strategies, the SDS became an

essential force on the Left, causing the SDS to perceive itself
independent of other leftist organizations, namely the LID.
Another difference between the SDS and the LID exposed by ERAP
concerned the Old Left and New Left's relationship and interest in
cooperating with liberalism.

The LID had accepted state liberalism

as an agency for social change and used it as a channel to push for
domestic reform.

The SDS, however, was wary of liberalism.

In its

Port Huron Statement, it criticized the Democratic party (the
majority party in power) which represented, government sponsored
liberalism.

The Port Huron Statement criticized the Party for not

going far enough in anti-poverty and civil rights reforms.

At this

time, the SDS felt that such reforms could be enhanced if the
Democrats were prodded by private citizens and were able to purge
the Party of Dixiecrats.

However, in 1963, America and the New Era

displayed a growing distrust of liberalism and cooperation with the
Democratic party.

The SDS doubted the liberal establishment's

concern for social reform.

Cold War defense spending especially

had usurped necessary resources for welfare projects.

The Cold War

had also helped create a government bureaucracy which had alienated
itself from the public.

The liberal bureaucracy's main interest

was not in reform, but in preserving itself.

By offering top-down

welfare policies, the government had become more powerful and
removed from the people.

Fundamental reforms facilitating
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political participation and responding to the actual needs of the
people had not been enacted.

The SDS did not consider such issue-

specific reforms as honest approaches to social problems.

Such

legislation was neither long term nor intended to make any
comprehensive changes in the political and social structures.(8)
America and the New Era continued to rebuke the "New Frontier"
for failing to instigate radical changes in the American economy;
for supporting elite and private industries; and for being lax in
encouraging racial equality, voting rights, low-income housing
development, and integration.(9)
The SDS confronted the liberal abandonment of a socially
radical platform by urging the creation of alliances with nonEstablishment organizations.

This would reactivate the Left and

basic reforms outlined in the in The Port Huron Statement could be
attained (The eventual organization which would lead the New Left
suggested by America and the New Era would be the SDS through its
ERAP).(10)
The LID was obviously disturbed by the SDS1s position on
liberalism.

The LID had followed Norman Thomas's suggestion that

the League attempt to achieve social changes by working within the
bi-party system.

Following The Port Huron Statement. Michael

Harrington reminded the SDS that "American liberalism for all of
its flaws, was the mass left of the society and that radicals had
to speak positive in it . . .

" and then he hoped, the current

liberals would shift to the Left.(11)

The LID was also concerned

with the outright effrontery of the SDS whose leaders criticized
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the Old Left in America and the New Era one year after Port Huron.
The SDS disparaged the LID's sell-out to postwar liberalism,
stating that the (liberal) Left had become "a style of politics
which emphasizes cocktail parties and reforms rather than protest
marches . . . "(12)

ERAP's approach of working outside existing

political structures represented the rejection of the LID’s tactic
of forming alliances with liberals and ultimately proved in clear
view to the SDS that liberalism was a failure and useless in
generating social reform.
ERAP actively expressed its disapproval of liberalism also by
its advocacy of participatory democracy.

Unlike the state

sponsored top-down reforms of presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the
SDS planned to empower communities and have the recipients
themselves decide on reforms and programs.(13)

The bottom-up

approach was best displayed by the NCUP block organizations which
successfully petitioned for a community-based service center.

The

granting of more political power to the poor was also represented
by the election of a slate of local NCUP members to the Clinton
Hill area poverty board.
The JOIN community union consciously worked to give
residents more power in the organization's operations by eventually
insisting that local residents become revolving chairmen of JOIN.
In Richard Rothstein's (Chicago ERAP organizer) "A Short History of
ERAP, 11 he described ERAP as an organization in which its "founders
define tasks in terms of how they can largely give away power." (14)
But Michael Harrington, an authority on the "other America"
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and principal liaison between the SDS and the LID at this time,
criticized ERAP's attempts at empowerment.

Harrington claimed in

a New Republic article February 1966 ("The Mystical Militants")
that the poor were too disorganized and inarticulate and it was
hopeless to demand reforms without cooperating with the liberal
establishment.(15)
Because of the failures of many ERAP chapters and programs,
the SDS eventually had to agree that the poor were too
disorganized.

Yet, the SDS became more resolute in its position;

ERAP's unsuccessful encounters with state bureaucracy and
disappointment with President Johnson's lack of response to
Community Action Projects (which he endorsed) only reinforced the
SDS's negative opinion of liberalism.

Johnson indicated that the

federal government would be sympathetic to demands made by
community groups, rather than by city or federal leaders.

He

justified the Community Action Project aspect of the War on
Poverty, stating "these are not plans prepared in Washington
and imposed upon by hundreds of different situations.

They are

based on the fact that local citizens best understand their
problems and best know how to deal with those problems."(16)
However, ERAP soon learned that city officials who had no
relationship with the poor designed programs and allocated antipoverty funds.

According to the SDS, Chicago's JOIN, for example,

could not seize Mayor Daley's control of War on Poverty funds and
was never represented on Daley's commission to administer such
grants, despite picketing and mailing campaigns to state
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representatives in Springfield.(17)
The SDS and its ERAP were disenchanted by the liberal
establishment's approach to poverty.

Although ERAP praised Johnson

for programs in education, job training, and national service
corps, and for bringing the issue of poverty to the fore, it was
also greatly disappointed.

Not only did the SDS claim that

the Johnson administration failed to appropriate sufficient funds,
but was also remiss in attacking poverty at its base.

According to

the SDS, federal government incentives for full production,
requiring a massive workforce, were necessary and industries which
were most apt to make use of automation (such as defense) should be
discouraged because they scaled down job availability.(18)
The question of forming an alliance with liberals further
helped widen the gap between the LID and the SDS.

The SDS not

only feared being co-opted by (i.e., deactivated by) liberals, as
was the LID, but also found liberalism to be ineffective in dealing
with such difficult and vital issues as poverty.

Such differences

in the Left's relationship with the liberal state made separation
not only inevitable, but necessary.

Such a break was required if

the SDS was to carry out its agenda in The Port Huron Statement.
The third difference between the LID and the SDS which ERAP
disclosed regarded organizational procedures.

The SDS backed away

from the centralized approach in the organization of ERAP.

ERAP

headquarters were originally located in Ann Arbor, but the office
was eliminated when ERAP chapters became independent in 1965.
Although the decentralization helped accelerate the downfall of
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ERAP, such procedure did represent a different organizational
method within the Left.

Whereas the LID held tight control over

the actions of the SDS (especially after the Port Huron conflict),
the SDS1s ERAP experimented with less control and focused on
empowering its individual chapters.
By mid-1964, members of the SDS and of ERAP chapters began to
openly question the centralized authority of ERAP.

Paul Potter,

president of the SDS from 1964 to 1965, called for more empowerment
of ERAP chapters.

In the July 1964 SDS Bulletin, he urged members

of ERAP chapters to formulate policies independent of the central
office's guidance.

Members in each ERAP chapter were encouraged to

discuss among themselves what actions and reforms were necessary
for their communities.(19)

The justification for decentralization

was best expressed by Carol McEldowney, an ERAP organizer in
Cleveland.

Like Potter, she was concerned that ERAP and the SDS's

democratic goals were jeopardized by having ultimate organization
power situated in one location.

McEldowney opined that the

immediate danger of a centralized organization had made the poor
feel more powerless since, like local and federal government
leaders, ERAP chapters were only part of larger organization.(20)
What further precipitated the decentralization of ERAP was the
Vietnam issue with which the SDS began to concern itself by late
1964 and early 1965.

SDS National Secretary C. Clark Kissinger

foresaw Vietnam as a major issue and claimed that mass student
involvement would be necessary to protest U.S. intervention.

By

focusing its attention on the Vietnam War and the draft, old guard
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SDS members, who had not committed themselves to the ERAP
experiment, and younger and newer SDS members who were attracted to
the organization by its April 17, 1965 Vietnam War demonstration,
pushed ERAP off the center of the agenda.

ERAP was now perceived

as a non-radical hobby horse of original SDS leaders such as Rennie
Davis, Todd Gitlin, and Carl Wittman.

The SDS thus sacrificed ERAP

in March 1965, in favor of protesting the war, forcing ERAP
chapters to become independent as well as self-sufficient.(21)
There were many reasons for decentralization.

ERAP granted

more authority to its chapters initially for experimental
democratic purposes and to aid their work in empowering local
residents.

By Spring 1965, however, the final decision to let ERAP

become independent of a central office and of the SDS was made due
to the prioritization of resources in protesting U.S. intervention
in Vietnam and the desires of the new generation of SDSers who
considered the SDS to be nothing more than an antiwar group.
However, according to the views of Potter and McEldowney, even if
the Vietnam issue had not occupied the SDS1s main concern, it is
likely that ERAP would still have been decentralized.
ERAP were intent on empowering its chapters.

The SDS and

The act of granting

a high degree of freedom to a sub-organization represented a
rejection of the LID's authoritarian control over its projects
and subordinates.

Thus, the SDS and ERAP's policy of

decentralization proved once more that the LID and the SDS had
basically become two separate entities.
ERAP demonstrated the growing rift between the SDS and the LID

which had been growing since 1961.

By rejecting the LID's position

on activism, liberalism, and organization, the SDS had shown it was
departing from its identification with the Old Left.

Distancing

itself from the Old Left was necessary in order to build a revived
American Left.

Although it is obvious that The Port Huron

Statement and America and the New Era first expressed the SDS1s
disaffection with the LID, ERAP's significance is that it was a
tangible and active program with strategies and purposes opposed to
the principles of the Old Left.

CONCLUSION

When ERAP was created, it was to mobilize the poor in northern
American cities.

The program originally followed the principles of

the LID by emphasizing research and informing students of the
circumstances and issues regarding poverty.

From 1964 to ERAP's

complete demise in 1967, however, the program veered from the
guidelines of its parent organization by depending on the direct
participation of students.

ERAP also rejected the LID's amicable

relationship and compromise with the state liberalism of the
Democratic party.

Finally, ERAP variated from the LID by

\

decentralizing the organization between ERAP and the SDS and
between ERAP and its chapters and by infusing ERAP sponsored
community unions with the power to direct their own programs.
Although it cannot be proven that members of the SDS and ERAP
designed the strategies and goals of ERAP with the purpose in mind
to actively declare its independence from the LID, it can be argued
persuasively that ERAP did serve as an agent which demonstrated
that the LID and the SDS were becoming two separate divisions on
the Left.
The immediate result of ERAP acting as an instrument
representing Old Left and New Left differences was the LID-SDS
breakup in fall 1965.

ERAP's display of differences between the
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two organizations had magnified the already tense relationship
created by the Port Huron confrontation.

ERAP had shown the LID

that the SDS was now an organization unto itself with no direct
ties to other leftist groups.

This independence encouraged the SDS

to become more militant and outspoken.

The SDS was thus

uninhibited from taking a stand against U.S. cooperation with South
African apartheid and American involvement in Vietnam.

By freeing

itself from the leadership of the LID, the SDS was enabled to
organize protests on issues of which the LID and the SDS did not
agree.
In April 1965, the SDS organized the March on Washington
against U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
by the LID.

The march was not supported

In fact, the League issued a message to the press the

day before the inarch, disclaiming collusion with the participants.
The LID was particularly

disturbed by the SDS1s cooperation with

the Maoist Progressive Labor Party in organizing the event.(1)
Regardless of the lack of support from its affiliate, the SDS
proceeded with the protest which drew 20,000 to 25,000
participants.

Because of the large turnout, the media naturally

reported the demonstration.

Such national coverage informed

several students of the existence of the SDS who subsequently
became SDS members. (2)

This massive increase was welcomed by the

SDS, according to Todd Gitlin in The Whole World is Watching:

Mass

Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. In late 1964 and
early 1965, the SDS under National Secretary C. Clark Kissinger
intended to convert the SDS from a small personalized organization

into a mass movement in order to confront effectively U.S.
involvement in Vietnam and the draft.

The LID was disappointed

with the increase in membership and was concerned that such a wide
interest in the SDS would attract radical and undisciplined
elements and subvert the student organization.(3)

But by 1965, the

SDS did not let the interests of the LID determine its policy
regarding membership enlargement, association with radical
leftists, and positions on foreign policy issues.

Such freedom to

design its own program would not have been possible without the
independent environment generated by ERAP.(4)
The LID formally cut all ties with the SDS on October 4,
1965.(5)

Although the LID realized that the SDS had evolved into

an organization different in philosophy, purpose, and strategy,
the immediate cause of the split was that the SDS1s militant
politics threatened the LID's tax-exemption status and the LID
objected to the change in the SDS Constitution at the June 1965
National Conference in Kewadin, Michigan.

Only months after the

SDS had worked with radical left elements like Progressive Labor
and the DuBois Clubs in the April demonstration, the SDS struck out
the clause in its constitution barring members of "totalitarian"
organizations. (6)

Thus, the SDS embarked on its own and faced the

burdens and dangers which such independence entailed.

Along with

the freedom to formulate and implement its own massive anti-Vietnam
War and anti-draft program came the responsibility of confronting
the new generation of SDSers (with a variety of views) and
communist organizations interested in infiltrating the SDS.
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The appearance of the new radical elements became obvious by
1967-1968.

At the December 1968 National Conference in Chicago,

the Progressive Labor Party, which had been admitted to the SDS in
1966, demanded that the SDS be the vanguard party of a working
class socialist movement.(7)

The other two factions which had

emerged by 1968, the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) and the
Weathermen, disagreed with Progressive Labor's plan.

RYM called

on students to infiltrate the workforce and work beside their
blue-collar counterparts to create a popular revolution.

The

Weathermen discounted chances for success of a working class
revolution and supported isolated (violent) acts protesting the
Establishment which endorsed imperialism, racism, and sexism.(8)
*

The SDS had shifted its strategy from a reformist approach to one
in favor of radical governmental change.

Without the Old Left

(LID) to harness the SDS1s moderate character, the SDS was allowed
to descend into a radical and popularly unattractive organization.
Because of the differences between Progressive Labor and RYM
and the Weathermen, the SDS splintered into two factions at the
December 1968 National Conference.

In early 1969, RYM and the

Weathermen split over their opposing revolutionary strategies and
goals.

By mid-1969, the Weathermen had gone underground and RYM

had dissolved.(9)

The disintegration of the SDS was partly caused

by its gradual and permanent cessation of a direct relationship
with the LID.

Because of its sudden rise in popularity with

radical elements and preoccupation with Vietnam, the SDS was never
able to prepare and carry out a formal ideology which might have
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been possible had the SDS remained connected to the LID.

The

demise of the SDS was also caused by the lack of a steady and firm
organizational base.

The annual elections of new officers,

the multitude of National Conferences, and various ideas brought in
from the new members since 1965 prevented the SDS from providing
itself with a solid definition of what type of organization it
would be and shield itself from ideas different from The Port Huron
Statement.

But, it was still vital for the SDS to separate itself

from the LID in order to have the national attention which it
received.

In order to build a newly defined and revived American

Left, the SDS had to remove all vestiges of the Old Left.
Todd Gitlin indicated in The Whole World is Watching that the
SDS considered itself the "New Left" by 1963, the year ERAP began.
The irony is that, at this time, the SDS still belonged to the Old
Left, the LID.

Perhaps, by self-fulfilling prophecy, the SDS was

determined to become a truly "New Left."

This was made possible by

the strategies, goals, and purposes of ERAP which opposed the LID
principles.

Thus, in the context of the LID-SDS conflict, ERAP was

an expression of the SDS1s rejection of the Old Left.

ERAP was a

link in the gradual division between the SDS and the LID, wedged
between The Port Huron Statement and the 1965 Kewadin Conference.
ERAP created a sense of independence and self-assertion necessary
for the SDS to create a new and active Left, fully realized by
1965.
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